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In this paper we introduce and discuss the three drivers of recent intensive payment 
systems reforms globally in the last 5 years in the process of implementing safe and efficient 
payment systems. We define the first driver as the strong domestic demand for financial 
stability and better financial services. The second driver is the increasing level of 
international cooperation and efforts of international financial institutions. The third driver is 
the impact positive externalities of globalisation reflected in the ICT area. The ICT firms are 
providing “turnkey” payment systems solutions and ready-to-use network, namely SWIFT, 
for a world economy of any size to go live with a robust payment system infrastructure. 
When we analyse various payment systems reform cases from the world economies under 
different groups, we observe the impacts of these drivers strongly. Yet there are weaknesses 
in most of the systems worldwide, when these systems are assessed against the newly 
developed “best-practices” named the core principles for Systemically Important Payment 
Systems as developed under the aegis of BIS/CPSS. In our analysis, we also observe that 
these drivers are also helping for the world economies not only to implement the first 
generation of payment systems but also to continuously improve their systems to meet higher 
standards. 
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1. Introduction 
Payment systems area is emerging as a new discipline in economics and finance, 
which was regarded as only a technological infrastructure issue until recently.  
The amount of academic studies and researches produced to analyse its effect on 
macro and micro economy is quite limited in number. Areas like the impact of 
payment systems on monetary policy, transmission mechanisms, and financial 
stability and on issues concerning regulation, innovation, pricing, and competition 
remain to be further investigated. 
Yet there are excellent papers accessible from Federal Reserve, Bank of 
England, Bank of Finland, IMF and World Bank resources, among others.  
Recently, we observe intensive reforms carried out by most of the world 
economies of any size in the process of implementing safe and efficient payment 
systems or improving the existing ones worldwide in the last 5 years particularly. 
And in fact huge resources are being spent for this process, in both advanced and 
developing countries. What are the drivers behind these efforts of the intensive 
reforms going on and their subsequent positive results?  
We shall quite often mention “safe and efficient payment systems”, where safety 
and efficiency are accepted as public policy objectives.  
We observe that there are three main drivers of these reforms:  
We call the first driver “domestic demand”, pushed by economic agents in an 
economy to provide financial stability and advanced financial services. Central 
banks have increased their efforts for improving the effectiveness of monetary 
policy by implementing robust payment systems. Private sector and their customers 
are looking into the ways to improve the infrastructure for payments and thus 
accessing to better banking services and in the meantime increasing liquidity in the 
system. Having smoothly running payment systems is also regarded one of the 
basic factors of national competitiveness, we may observe this fact in central bank 
web sites when they describe the effectiveness of their national payment systems. 
Second driver is the growing and institutionalised framework of international 
cooperation and the efforts of international financial institutions (IFIs) in this 
context to assist the member countries and also to enforce the establishment of 
“best-practices” in payment systems for a global financial stability. After the G-7 
summit in Lyon in 1996 where a strategy was developed to improve payment  
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systems’ reforms worldwide, inter alia, as one of the key elements of financial 
stability and international financial institutions were called for action to speed up 
their efforts. In 2000, under the aegis of BIS/CPSS, a report was produced to set up 
standards and “best-practices” in payment systems named the “Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems” (we shall hereafter refer to this shortly 
as “core principles”) and soon after IMF and WB started a process (FSAP) to 
assess, among other things, the payment systems in member countries against the 
core principles and furthermore to enforce the best-practices by also providing 
financial and technical assistance. 
The third driver, we believe, is the existence of innovative products and services 
of ICT firms, which we call the impact of positive externalities of globalisation in 
this context. Some global IT firms provide product-based (in some cases, off-the-
shelf or somewhat turn-key) solutions that is tailored for any type of world economy 
to go live with a robust  payment system much quicker than with any bespoke 
developed payment system. And we should also mention SWIFT
1, the world’s 
banking and payments network, somewhat a monopoly. SWIFT provides highly 
reliable communications network, tailored to be used for any national or cross-
border payment system’s requirements. Even for the developing economies where 
telecommunications infrastructure may be quite poor, SWIFT’s global web may 
provide them with the standard high security and reliability infrastructure that they 
need in the process of implementing national payment systems.    
In this paper we shall introduce and discuss these three drivers to analyse 
whether these drivers have actually contributed to the increasing numbers and 
robustness of the payment systems worldwide. And then we shall investigate what 
the new challenges are for the world economies, whilst in the history of payment 
systems so far, most of the widespread successful implementations of payment 
systems globally have been accumulated in the passing 5 years, as a result of 
concerted efforts explained above. 
In Chapter 2 of this paper, we shall introduce major concepts, current issues and 
recent developments of payment systems providing a context for the vitality of 
payment systems for an economy of any size, and as a result, why public policy 
                                                 
1 SWIFT is the financial industry-owned co-operative supplying secure, standardised messaging services 
and interface software to 7,650 financial institutions in over 200 countries. SWIFT's worldwide 
community includes banks, broker/dealers and investment managers, as well as their market 
infrastructures in payments, securities, treasury and trade.  
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objective is so strongly dedicated to improving payment systems’ effectiveness, 
which is in fact the first driver. We shall also explore the roles of public and private 
sector, focusing particularly on the roles of the central banks. This chapter will 
conclude with an introduction of a very prominent recent report of BIS/CPSS on the 
“Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems” that actually set the 
standards (these standards are also called “best-practices”) for payment systems. In 
this context, the focus of this paper is inter-bank Large Value Payment Systems 
(LVPS), although payment system issues go far beyond LVPS and extent into the 
other related settlement systems of securities
2 and foreign exchange and retail 
payment systems, e-payments, e-money etc., which require more detailed analysis 
in a similar fashion in their own merit. 
In Chapter 3, we shall analyse the existence and role of international cooperation 
in the reform process worldwide, the second driver. Here we will provide insight 
into how individual economies of the world, categorised under various groupings, 
are progressing towards meeting the high standards of the core principles. In this 
context, we analyse 21 countries in different groups by looking at the findings of 
IMF/WB joint initiative, FSAP reports that assess the implementation of the above-
mentioned best-practices in these countries, which is the main element of 
international cooperation. We categorise the countries as advanced, major emerging 
market, EU accession, transition and developing countries. In doing this analysis, 
we also provide information from various resources, where available, to understand 
the level of international financial and technical assistance to individual countries.   
In Chapter 4, we analyse the positive effects of global ICT firms to this process 
by providing product-based payment systems solutions and network infrastructure, 
which we believe are reflected in the reform process as positive externalities of 
globalisation in payment systems, i.e. the third driver of the reforms. Yet, as we 
shall discuss, this force by itself alone is not providing a total solution to meet all 
the criteria in the core principles, there are other challenges that need to be 
addressed from within the economy by organising and coordinating the domestic 
stakeholders on the issues like legal infrastructure, governance, transparency and 
                                                 
2 Indeed most often, payment systems’ issues of financial stability and principles of  safety and 
efficiency we mention in this paper are also true in case of Securities Settlement Systems (SSS) as public 
policy objectives. In advanced economies, payment and securities settlement systems are inter-connected 
and operationally integrated. They are often named together as Payment and Securities Settlement 
Systems (PSSS).  
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some others to implement a payment system that could be called as “safe and 
efficient”.  
In Chapter 5, we shall conclude with a summary of the findings.  
2. Why Payment Systems are Vital for An Economy; Public Policy Objectives 
and Associated Issues  
2.1. Payment Systems Background 
“If, as Milton Friedman once noted, very few things in a society can happen if 
they are not financed by money, then the way in which money is transferred across 
people must be one of society’s most crucial concerns. Indeed, rules have been laid 
out by markets and governments in all countries and at all times to ensure that 
payments were effected as safely and expeditiously as feasible, given the state of 
technological and institutional development. Only recently, however, with the 
economies becoming webs of massive and rapid payment flows with very large risk 
potentials, governments have started to consider systematically how to oversee 
payment activities.” (Bassone and Cirasino, 2001) 
A payment system consists of a set of instruments, banking procedures and, 
typically, interbank funds transfer systems that ensure the circulation of money 
(BIS/CPSS-Glossary, BIS/CPSS-Red Book, 1993 and EU-Blue Book, 1999).  
A typical payment system interconnects the banks and central bank, and recently 
mostly in real-time computer networks and enable them to exchange payments. 
Although it may appear to be an expensive technology issue rather than anything 
else at the first glance, it is equally challenging in terms of legal, operational and 
governance issues as there are very high values flowing through the payment 
systems with questions of sufficient containment of credit and liquidity risks, 
settlement finality, creditworthiness of settlement assets, responsibilities of players, 
contingency arrangements, accountability and transparency of governance, and so 
on. The problem may even be more complicated when we consider the direct 
participants of systems becoming non-banks as well besides banks that are not 
regulated as strictly as banks and in certain cases connection requirements of 
payment systems to securities settlement systems and/or cross-border connections.  
Payment systems are a vital part of the economic and financial infrastructure. 
Their efficient functioning, allowing transactions to be completed safely and on 
time makes a key contribution to overall economic performance (Bank of England-
Oversight, 2000).   
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While safe and efficient payment systems are critical to the effective functioning 
of the financial system and financial stability, poorly designed payment systems 
may be major channels by which shocks can be transmitted across domestic and 
international financial systems and markets (BIS/CPSS-CPSIPS, 2001).  
2.2. How Payment Systems Evolved in the Last Three Decades 
In early 80’s there were not well-established standards or knowledge of “best 
practices” for payment systems. There were very few implementations around the 
globe that could be pointed as safe and efficient when we look back with the 
perspective and knowledge of today. The interest of the related international 
institutions was not there and yet central banks were exchanging expertise and 
experience mainly on bi-lateral basis. 
The challenge was to plan and build an efficient payment system for the conduct 
of monetary policy successfully and improving banking services for any economy. 
The safety and governance issues were not amongst the items of top priority. 
It was also the time that MNCs were prioritising and emphasising the importance 
of well-functioning payment systems in a country when they speak about their 
future investment rationales, and they were encouraging world markets, including 
emerging markets, to implement efficient payment systems and develop cross-
border connections, preferably in a STP
3 (Straight Through Processing) fashion, 
considering that that they could speed up collecting their generated funds in retail 
offices via domestic payment systems and then they could move their money to 
their overseas accounts via internationally connected payment systems.    
On the other hand, the crises of the second half of the 90’s in Asia and South 
America revealed serious flaws not only in macro economic management, but also 
in the structure and regulation of financial markets in both debtor and creditor 
countries. This brought about international policy responses in a number of areas 
(Trundle, 2000).  
As a result of the growing interest in implementing safe and efficient payment 
systems globally and seminal works on payment systems namely so called “Red 
Books” describing G-10 countries’ payment systems and then Lamfalussy Report 
on inter-bank netting schemes, efforts by individual countries, both in advanced and 
                                                 
3 STP is considered to be a fully automatic and computerised way of transaction processing, with 
minimal or no manual intervention.  
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emerging markets, increased this process of building and renewing existing systems 
and level of international cooperation became more systematic under the aegis of 
BIS/CPSS.     
In 1997, an ad hoc working party on financial stability in emerging market 
economies was set up in response to an initiative taken at 1996 summit of G-7 at 
Lyon. It set out a strategy for fostering financial stability in countries experiencing 
rapid economic growth and undergoing substantial changes in their financial 
system.  One of the key elements of robust financial systems was reported to be 
“promoting robust payment, settlement and custody arrangements” and the report 
indicated that “the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the G-10 
central banks should continue to foster the development of efficient and robust 
payment and settlement systems and practices” (Draghi, 1997). 
Then there came the BIS/CPSS report on CPSIPS (2001) (see section 2.8), where 
most of the issues in the process of planning and implementing safe and efficient 
payment systems were addressed in detail under the consensus of central banks and 
banks worldwide and related international institutions. 
IMFC and G-7 also highlighted the importance of assessing vulnerabilities by an 
approach “promoting the stability and integrity of the international monetary and 
financial system, as a global public good” (IMF-Communiqué, 2001). 
Eventually, IMF and World Bank initiated a policy to enforce the 
implementation of best practices as mentioned in this report on a global base. 
Therefore, the new millennium started to be a time in the history of payment 
systems where standards, best-practices and associated assessment procedures were 
quite clearly in place and furthermore the roles of central banks were defined and 
detailed. Thanks to the strong partnership of international financial institutions, 
central banks and private sector globally, not only advanced economies have the 
capability of building safe and efficient payment systems but also emerging and 
developing economies have the necessary guidelines to move forward in this 
process. 
2.3. Payment Systems Industry 
2.3.1. Central Banks 
Central banks have a leading position in payment systems, particularly because 
of their strong interest in financial stability, their role in providing settlement  
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accounts for payment system participants, and their concerns with the functioning 
of money markets for the implementation of monetary policy and with maintaining 
confidence in the domestic currency both in normal circumstances and in a crisis. 
The expertise they have developed through carrying out these functions means that 
central banks have a leading role to play in respect of systemically important 
payment systems
4; in many cases they have been given explicit responsibilities in 
this area (BIS/CPSS-CPSIPS, 2001). 
In 80’s and maybe even in 90’s, probably the role of central banks in payment 
systems, among other things, could not be very clearly defined in a standard way all 
throughout the world economies, though in most of the cases it was de facto the 
central banks that planned and implemented and even operated the major payment 
systems in the country. And the controversy was there as to whether central banks 
(public sector) or banks (private sector) had to have a leading role in payment 
systems.  
However, starting with the new millennium, particularly after the report of 
BIS/CPSS on the core principles, the role of central banks are now clarified in that 
they are supposed to play a very active role in payment systems, defined by the 
relatively new concept “oversight” as explained below in Section 2.3.3.  
Today when we look at the implementation worldwide, we see that central banks 
are, in most of the cases the owners and operators of the country’s large value 
payment systems, as well as they are the regulators and overseers of the payment 
systems owned by themselves or by private sector. Recently most of the central 
banks have amended their laws to include their role in smooth functioning of 
payment systems 
2.3.2. Private Sector 
When we speak of private sector in the context of payment systems, we usually 
refer to the banks acting in an economy. The banks have their account with central 
banks and they use mainly central bank accounts to transfer funds between 
themselves. 
On the other hand, they are the providers of payment services to their retail or 
corporate clients. Indeed some major international banks are said to own and 
operate payment networks that are in some cases larger in value and volume than 
most of the national payment systems around the globe. 
                                                 
4 Systemically important payment systems (SIPS) are explained in Section 2.8.  
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The banks usually have some clearinghouses in a country that is set up by their 
own finance and management, usually under the coordination of the bankers 
associations. This type of systems, as being different from the central bank’s owned 
and operated systems tend to be Deferred Net System (DNS) systems, where the 
priority is liquidity creation via multilateral limits and deferred settlement. 
The banks are direct members of central bank systems that they prefer to use 
mainly for monetary policy payments. 
2.3.3. Oversight Function 
BIS/CPSS glossary (2003) defines the oversight function as “a central bank task, 
principally intended to promote the smooth functioning of payment systems and to 
protect the financial system from possible ‘domino effects’ which may occur when 
one or more participants in the payment system incur credit or liquidity problems. 
Payment systems oversight aims at a given system (e.g. a funds transfer system) 
rather than individual participants.” 
The threats to financial sector, real economy and currency posed by risks (see 
section 2.5) arising from payment and securities settlement must be limited by 
implementing suitable measures. With this particular goal in mind, the central 
banks have drawn up various oversight standards (Bundesbank, 2004).  
Padoa-Schioppa (2003) defines this function as “a neologism for an old central 
bank activity, which is the process of being reshaped in a new and more formal 
way”. 
As an example, one of the four basic tasks of European Central Bank is “the 
promotion of smooth functioning of the payment systems” as depicted in BOX 1 
below. 
BOX 1. Oversight Role of ECB 
European Central Bank states its interest in payment systems as following: 
“Like any central bank, the ECB, together with the Eurosystem is interested in 
the prudent design and management of the payment and securities clearing and 
settlement systems which process its currency. It pays close attention to their 
smooth functioning, as well as to reducing    the related potential risks.  
The smooth functioning is crucial for:  a sound currency and for the conduct of 
monetary policy, the functioning of financial markets and the maintenance of 
banking and financial stability.”     (ECB Website)  
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Payment systems oversight function is defined as a duty of central banks to 
achieve objectives relating to the safety and efficiency of the payment systems by 
monitoring existing and planned arrangements and assessing them against 
objectives and policies and eventually planning and implementing necessary 
changes.Recently oversight function is structured to make sure that the core 
principles are met by the systems overseen and central bank is fulfilling its 
responsibilities as defined in this report. 
2.3.4. Oversight Function vs. Supervision Function 
Oversight function is mainly used in the context of payment systems and it is 
separate from but closely related to banking supervision. 
Payment system oversight concentrates on the stability of the system as a whole, 
while the supervisors of individual banks and other financial institutions focus on 
the risks to specific participants. In particular, in assessing payment system risks, 
overseers may need to take into account the ability of individual participants to 
fulfil their responsibilities in the system. In monitoring the financial risks for an 
individual institution, the supervisors may need to take into account risks to which 
participants can be exposed as a result of participation in the systems and which 
could affect the viability of the institution. Regular exchanges of views and 
information between supervisors and overseers, including, where relevant, about 
key individual participants, can assist these complementary objectives. These 
exchanges can often benefit from agreements on the sharing of information 
(BIS/CPSS-CPSIPS, 2001). 
2.3.5. Competition 
As we shall discuss later payment systems industry may broadly be categorised 
into two market segments: wholesale payments (very large amounts but low 
transaction volumes) and retail payments (usually low amounts and very high 
transaction volumes).  
What we observe today worldwide is that large value payment systems are the 
central bank monopolies. Have market forces failed even in advanced economies to 
implement the country’s main large value payment systems or is it because payment 
system services are not sufficiently deregulated? 
As Bassone and Cirasino (2001) discusses, to achieve the two-fold public policy 
objectives in payment systems, namely “safety and efficiency”, may require  
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markets for payment services to be largely concentrated and eventually to be 
dominated by a few or even by a single provider. And then they suggest that 
because of this, the set of operational objectives of the overseer should be 
broadened to include protection of participants and users from risks of monopolistic 
practices. 
Besides, central banks’ being a monopoly in large value payment systems is 
mainly a consequence of central banks statutory role and of the fact that final 
settlement takes place in central bank money as settlement asset as we discuss in 
detail in Section 2.7. 
On the other hand, central banks apply payment fees to their services to recover 
their investments and operating costs in the long run. Therefore, it could be said that 
the central banks charge the banks quite reasonably for payment services. 
In fact, the controversy on competition in this context is rather based on the way 
that the commercial banks charge their customers for payment services.  
In UK, the Cruickshank
5 report, investigating competition in UK banking 
services, concluded that there was a profound lack of competition in payment 
systems (HM Treasury, 2000 and 2001). According to the review, this was caused 
by the underlying economic characteristics of the industry, where network effects
6 
place a natural limit on the level of competition
7.   
In the context of developing economies, as we shall discuss with various 
examples in Chapter 3, it could be said that market forces not only have failed in 
large value payment systems but also they have failed in implementing retail 
payment systems and securities settlement systems, where public sector is expected 
to do wise investment decisions.  
                                                 
5 This report was prepared after the Chancellor of the Exchequer had asked Mr. Don Cruickshank to 
carry out a review of the banking industry in the UK, with a particular remit to consider the levels of 
innovation, competition and efficiency In 1998. 
6 Kari Kempainen (2003) discusses that payment systems industry inherently has many characteristics in 
common with network industries. 
7 Consequently  the Chancellor of Exchequer stated that “The money transmission system affects every 
cheque, every credit card and every debit transaction. It reaches from every local cash dispenser to every 
corporate inter-bank transfer. Today I am announcing that we will legislate to ensure the UK payments 
system is open to new competition.” (Budget Speech 21 March 2000). Then a task force is created 
following the Chancellor's Pre-Budget report in November 2003 which said that the OFT would take on 
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On the other hand, an important conference
8 was organised jointly by ECB and 
BIS/CPSS in Frankfurt in 2003 in that private and public (central banks in this 
sense) sector authorities came together and discussed the “private and public sector 
challenges” in payment systems. One conclusion may be drawn safely from the 
papers, among other things, that the consolidation of wholesale, retail and securities 
settlement systems are continuing at a rapid pace globally to increase the level of 
efficiency and consumer satisfaction to the extent that scale and scope economies 
are reached in the services. Yet consolidation has almost realised in the large value 
payment systems, particularly in EU context and not so much in the others. 
2.4. Role of International Financial Institutions 
Role of BIS 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS)’ “The Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS)” (BIS/CPSS) has been serving as a forum for the 
central banks of the Group of Ten countries (G-10) to monitor and analyse 
developments in domestic payment, settlement and clearing systems as well as in 
cross-border and multi-currency settlement schemes. The work of the CPSS has 
contributed to a growing awareness of the need for sound risk management in large-
value funds transfer systems. Estimates compiled by the CPSS indicate that these 
systems transfer the equivalent of several trillion dollars per day in CPSS countries, 
a large portion of which is related to the settlement of financial market transactions. 
These systems and their risk management arrangements have often been a focus of 
the Committee's discussions, and over time it has compiled substantial information 
on their main characteristics both in CPSS and non-CPSS countries. 
Although BIS/CPSS does not officially define its works as “setting the 
standards” but rather defines its role as “contributing to the setting of the standards” 
indeed in practice what has come with the BIS/CPSS reports are globally accepted 
as “standards” in payment systems. 
Role of IMF and World Bank 
IMF and World Bank (WB) are jointly involved in payment systems area by 
assisting member countries in implementing the best-practices and enforcing their 
implementations. Particularly as part of the FSAP (Financial Sector Assessment 
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Program), IMF and WB carry out analysis to help central banks to strengthen 
payment systems infrastructure to minimise vulnerabilities to internal or external 
shocks.  IMF and WB expert staff are increasingly more involved in this issue and 
they join the “task forces” under the aegis of BIS/CPSS to work in the preparations 
of payment systems reports. 
2.5. Risks in Payment Systems 
In section 2.1 we mentioned the reasons why payment systems are vital for the 
economy and also mentioned that their disruption could extent beyond the 
participants and the system and may threaten the money markets and other domestic 
and international financial markets.  




BOX 2. Risks Inherent in Payment Systems 
Credit risk: the risk that a party within the system will be unable fully to meet its 
financial obligations within the system currently or at any time in the future;  
Liquidity risk: the risk that a party within the system will have insufficient funds to 
meet financial obligations within the system as and when expected, although it may 
be able to do so at some time in the future;  
Legal risk: the risk that a poor legal framework or legal uncertainties will cause or 
exacerbate credit or liquidity risks; 
Operational risk: the risk that operational factors such as technical malfunctions 
or operational mistakes will cause or exacerbate credit or liquidity risks; and 
Systemic risk: in the context of payment systems this is the risk that the inability of 
one of the participants to meet its obligations, or a disruption in the system itself, 
could result in the inability of other system participants or of financial institutions 
in other parts of the financial system to meet their obligations as they become due. 
Such a failure could cause widespread liquidity or credit problems and, as a result, 
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Once these risks are properly analysed and assessed, appropriate and effective 
mechanisms must be devised to monitor, manage and control them (BIS/CPSS-
CPSIPS, 2001). 
In fact, a “good” payment system may be said of the one that has the most 
optimal control and mitigation of all these risks. 
2.6. Classification of Payment Systems 
Classification by Value: Large Value vs Low Value Payment Systems 
Payment systems may firstly be classified by the amounts of funds that they are 
settling, whether wholesale, large inter-bank payments or retail, relatively small 
customer transfers.  
Large Value Payment Systems (LVPS)  process inter-bank money market 
transfers and central bank payments related to monetary policy transaction with 
significantly high values and the volume, i.e. the number of transactions, could be 
relatively small. These systems are fully electronic and automated systems 
connected to the banks, or in some cases non-banks as well, in real time 
transmission networks in advanced and emerging economies and some developing 
countries as well. Yet these LVPS are observed to be in forms of check clearing 
systems or some other types of manual processing systems in the majority of 
developing countries (these cases will be illustrated later in this paper by examples 
in Chapter 3). At least one LVPS in a country is owned and operated by central 
banks and they also realise the final settlement at the accounts of central bank. In 
developed markets we also observe LVPSs owned and operated by private sector, 
which are also connected to central bank LVPS for final settlement. Central bank 
owned LVPS are mainly modelled as Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) systems 
as we shall discuss in Section 2.6.2.   
Retail payment systems are those where there is a large volume of customer 
transfers with relatively low values; these systems are mainly owned and operated 
by private sector. They mainly process public utility payments and direct debits, 
credit card transactions and checks in forms of Automated Clearing Houses (ACH). 
There are quite a few cases where both large and small value payments are 
transferred and settled in one single payment system like Swiss SIC and Turkish 
TIC-RTGS systems (Heller, 2000 and Okay, 2001).  Okay (2001) discusses that the 
idea in such a modelling can be explained as (1) even small values when added  
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together may turn into critically high values, implying systemic risks, (2) There 
may be economies of scale and scope for a central bank in expanding capacity of 
one system to accommodate retails, because the costs are significantly lowered and 
new services may be provided to the retail customers such as RTGS transfers by use 
of a commercial bank internet services, (3) The participants may have advantages as 
they have lower costs in having just one simple interface for payments and their 
liquidity is not divided between different systems and (4) The retail customers may 
benefit by the lower fees and new banking services with an safe, efficient and 
consolidated payment structure. 
Classification by Settlement Type 
The processing of funds transfer involves two key elements. The first of this is 
type of transfer of information between the payer and payee banks. A funds transfer 
is initiated either by the transmission of a payment order or message requesting the 
transfer of funds to the payee. In today’s modern payment systems payment 
messages are transmitted electronically via telecommunications networks and they 
are processed according to predefined rules and operating procedures. Processing 
may include procedures such as identification, reconciliation and confirmation of 
payment messages. 
The second key element is settlement – that is actual transfer of funds between 
the payer’s bank and the payee’s bank. Settlement that is irrevocable and 
irreversible is described as final settlement. The settlement may be done on central 
bank accounts (central bank money) or on the commercial bank accounts 
(commercial bank money). In practice, final settlement of most of the payment 
systems will take place on the books of central bank (BIS/CPSS-RTGS, 1997). 
Payment systems can be classified broadly into gross settlement systems and net 
settlement systems.  
In a gross settlement system, the final settlement of funds occurs transaction by 
transaction, usually on a continuous or real-time basis. Systems that can effect final 
settlement on a continuous, transaction-by-transaction basis throughout the 
processing day are generally known as Real-Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) 
systems. 
In a net settlement system, on the other hand, the final settlement of funds 
transfers occurs on a net basis according to the rules and procedures of the system at  
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specific designated times, these systems are Deferred (or designated-time) Net 
Settlement Systems (DNS). 
In the DNS Systems, the transmission and settlement of a payment takes place in 
time lags. The time lag between the reception time of the payment by the system 
and the time of its settlement creates one of the major risks in payment systems 
called “credit risk”. Although the beneficiary has received the payment, the 
originator has not yet made the final payment in the books of the clearing system or 
central bank.  
On the other hand, RTGS systems check the availability of funds on the 
originator’s account before the system further process the payment message. 
Therefore, RTGS systems remove the possibility of credit risk. However, RTGS 
systems may cause another type of risk, liquidity risk. As the banks wait for 
incoming funds from counter-parties to proceed with pending payments, the 
payment system may go into a dead-lock situation causing liquidity problems. In 
modern payment systems this problem is overcome by advanced centralised queue 
mechanisms having grid-lock resolution facilities. And as it is observed with most 
of the RTGS systems today central bank daylight overdraft facilities greatly help to 
resolve the liquidity problems. 
During the past ten years a number of countries have decided to introduce RTGS 
systems to help limit settlement risks in the inter-bank payments process. 
Practically all CPSS countries have RTGS systems in operation and many other 
countries have also introduced, or are in the process of introducing RTGS systems.  
Indeed, as we shall discuss later in this paper on FSAP country cases, today’s 
concept of safe and efficient payment systems is mainly explained by the definition 
of a well-designed RTGS. 
2.7. Settlement Assets: Central Bank Money and Commercial Bank Money 
Another major issue in the field of payment systems relate to the settlement 
assets that a certain payment system is settling the credit and debit positions 
between the participants.   
Money is fundamental to the functioning of market economies inasmuch as these 
are based on exchange and credit. Today, any widely used form of money is 
denominated in a given currency. By sharing a currency, the individuals of a 
community have in common a measure of economic value, a means to store value,  
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and a set of instruments and procedures to transfer this value. However, since the 
value of money lies in trust, there can be no absolute guarantee that confidence in 
the currency can be preserved over time. It may be shaken by a monetary crisis or 
by the malfunctioning of the payment system. As a result, maintaining trust in the 
currency, and thus facilitating its circulation, becomes a major public interest. The 
central bank is, in most countries, the institution designated to pursue this public 
interest (BIS/CPSS-CB Money, 2003). 
BIS/CPSS-CB Money (2003) states, “in pursuit of its task, the central bank 
issues its own liabilities for use as money (central bank money). But the central 
bank is not the only issuer of money in an economy. The multiplicity both of issuers 
of money and of payment mechanisms is a common feature in all developed 
economies. Commercial banks are the other primary issuers, their liabilities (i.e. 
commercial bank money) representing in fact most of the stock of money. A 
healthy, competitive commercial banking market is seen as an essential element of 
an efficient and effective economy and thus central bank and commercial bank 
money coexist in a modern economy”.  
Then how can commercial bank money be regarded as safe settlement asset in 
payment systems? According to BIS/CPSS-CB Money (2003), “confidence in 
commercial bank money lies in the ability of commercial banks to convert their 
sight liabilities into the money of another commercial bank and/or into central bank 
money upon demand of their clients. In turn, confidence in central bank money rests 
in the ability of the central bank to maintain the value of the stock of currency as a 
whole (i.e. not only of the small portion it issues directly), or its inverse, to maintain 
price stability”. 
BIS/CPSS-CB Money (2003) mentions that there are two forms of central bank 
money: Banknotes and deposit money; banknotes, the most visible symbol of a 
currency, play a widespread role in retail payments. On the other hand, central bank 
deposit money plays a crucial role as the settlement asset in payment systems that 
transfer substantial values of funds each day and where there is significant potential 
systemic risk. In fact, central banks recognise that the ability to make payments 
safely and efficiently is crucial to the functioning of the financial system, both 
domestic and global and that sound and efficient payment mechanisms enhance the 
allocation of resources, facilitate growth and improve social welfare.  
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As we shall discuss below in Section 2.8, one of the best practices in payment 
systems has been defined as “Assets used for settlement should preferably be a 
claim on the central bank; where other assets (commercial bank money) are used, 
they should carry little or no credit risk”.  
2.8. Newly Developed Standards or “Best-Practices” in Payment Systems: 
“Core Principles For Systemically Important Payment Systems” 
Recognising the importance of well-functioning payment systems for financial 
stability in 1990s, international financial institutions pushed the process forward to 
define and eventually enforce the implementation of standards. In 1998, a Task 
Force composed of payment system experts of G10 and nonG10 central banks, IMF 
and WB was set up under the aegis of BIS/CPSS to write a report on the 
international standards and best practices in the area of payment systems. 
The Task Force identified, first, two public policy objectives as “safety and 
efficiency” for the so-called “systemically important payment systems (SIPS)” and 
then 10 core principles and 4 responsibilities were set-out for SIPS.   
In January 2001, BIS/CPSS published the report “Core Principles for 
Systemically Important Payment Systems”. The report was discussed globally by 
regional meetings before it was finalised. The report sets out ten core principles for 
SIPS and four “responsibilities” of the central banks in applying the core principles 
(BIS/CPSS-CPSIPS, 2001). 
The core principles were actually developed to serve as guidelines to promote 
safety and efficiency in the design and operation of SIPS. 
A payment system is “systemically important” where, if the system were 
insufficiently protected against risk, disruption within it could trigger or transmit 
further disruptions amongst participants or systemic disruptions in the financial area 
more widely. Systemic importance is determined mainly by the size and nature of 
the individual payments or their aggregate value. Systems handling specifically 
large-value payments would normally be considered systemically important 
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The core principles are defined in BIS/CPSS report (2001) as follows: 
BOX 3. Core principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems 
CP1.  The system should have a well-founded legal basis under all relevant 
jurisdictions. 
CP2.       The system’s rules and procedures should enable participants to have a 
clear understanding of the system’s impact on each of the financial risks they incur 
through participation in it. 
CP3.  The system should have clearly defined procedures for the management 
of credit risks and liquidity risks, which specify the respective responsibilities of the 
system operator and the participants and which provide appropriate incentives to 
manage and contain those risks.  
CP4.  The system should provide prompt final settlement on the day of value, 
preferably during the day and at a minimum at the end of the day. 
CP5.  A system in which multilateral netting takes place should, at a minimum, 
be capable of ensuring the timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an 
inability to settle by the participant with the largest single settlement obligation. 
CP6.  Assets used for settlement should preferably be a claim on the central 
bank; where other assets are used, they should carry little or no credit risk. 
CP7.  The system should ensure a high degree of security and operational 
reliability and should have contingency arrangements for timely completion of daily 
processing.  
CP8.  The system should provide a means of making payments which is 
practical for its users and efficient for the economy. 
CP9.  The system should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for 
participation, which permit fair and open access. 
CP10.  The system’s governance arrangements should be effective, accountable 
and transparent. 
 
And the role of central banks in applying the core principles are defined in 
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BOX 4. Responsibilities of the central bank in applying the core principles 
A - The central bank should define clearly its payment system objectives and should 
disclose publicly its role and major policies with respect to systemically important 
payment systems.  
B- The central bank should ensure that the systems it operates comply with the core 
principles. 
C - The central bank should oversee compliance with the core principles by systems 
it does not operate and it should have the ability to carry out this oversight.  
D - The central bank, in promoting payment system safety and efficiency through 
the core principles, should cooperate with other central banks and with any other 
relevant domestic or foreign authorities.  
The core principles may be classified under the headings of “safety” and 
“efficiency” as follows: 
Safety: CP1: Sound legal basis, CP2: Clear understanding of financial risks, 
CP3: Proper management of financial risks, CP4: Prompt final settlement, CP5: 
Completion of settlement and CP6: Safe settlement asset. 
Efficiency: CP7: Operationally secure and reliable, CP8: Practical and efficient 
way to make payments CP9: Fair and objective participation criteria and C10: 
Sound governance. 
2.9. Two Other Closely Related Settlement Systems: Securities and FX 
Settlement Systems and Pan-European Payment System: TARGET 
Securities Settlement Systems 
Securities settlement systems (SSS) are implemented to process bonds and bills 
and settle the results of the transfers from a bank’s stock account into another 
bank’s stock account.  In order to eliminate the principal risk in SSS a cash 
settlement system, preferably an RTGS, is required to settle the two separate legs of 
the transactions simultaneously, i.e. delivery versus payment. Today, the safest 
model is an RTGS system connected to an SSS in real-time delivery versus 
payment where two sides of the transaction are exchanged and settled 
simultaneously, which is also called real-time DvP Model 1.  
These systems likewise influence the smooth settlement of payments in many 
ways. Smoothly functioning Securities settlement systems are also necessary to  
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enable banks to transfer securities as collateral to the payment systems quickly and 
efficiently. This collateral serves to increase central bank liquidity to provide intra-
day credit and it can also be deployed in the framework of monetary policy 
operations (Bundesbank, 2004). 
Under the aegis of BIS/CPSS and IOSCO recommendations were developed to 
promote the implementation of measures that enhance financial stability, reduce 
risks, increase efficiency and provide adequate safeguards for investors (BIS/CPSS-
IOSCO, 2001). 
A Global FX Settlement System: CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) 
CLS Bank is based in New York and is an Edge Corporation bank supervised by 
the Federal Reserve. CLS Bank is a multi-currency bank, holding an account for 
each Settlement Member and an account at each eligible currency’s Central Bank
9, 
through which funds are received and paid. Technical and operational support is 
provided by CLS Services, an affiliate of CLS Bank (CLS Website). 
CLS Services, based in London, provides operational and back-office support to 
CLS Bank. 
With the average daily turnover in global FX transactions at almost US$2 
trillion, the FX market has long needed an effective cross-currency settlement 
process.  
CLS is a real-time system that enables simultaneous settlement globally, 
irrespective of time zones. It provides an ongoing process of submitting instructions 
- receiving payments of specified currencies from customers; funding - settling 
pairs of instructions that satisfy all criteria and execution - making pay-outs in 
specified currencies. Settlement is final and irrevocable or funds are returned same 
day. Participating banks get real-time settlement information that helps them to 
manage liquidity more efficiently, reduce credit risks and introduce operational 
efficiencies. 
The First Cross-Border Single Currency Payment System: TARGET 
In the European Union context, payment systems have been growing in 
importance over the past two decades. This is a result of an increase in both the 
volume and the value of transactions stemming from money and foreign exchange 
                                                 
9 As of January 2005, 15 major currencies are processed in CLS by having real-time connection to the 
RTGS systems of the respective countries.   
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markets and from financial markets in general. The introduction of the Euro in 1999 
fostered their integration in the Euro area and in the European Union in general 
(ECB Website). 
TARGET is the RTGS system for the Euro, offered by the “Eurosystem”. The 
Eurosystem comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) and the National Central 
Banks (NCBs) of those countries that have adopted the Euro. Since 1 January 1999 
the ECB has been responsible for conducting monetary policy for the Euro area - 
the world’s largest economy after the United States.  Target is used for the 
settlement of central bank operations, large-value Euro inter-bank transfers as well 
as other Euro payments. It provides real-time processing, settlement in central bank 
money and immediate finality (ECB Website). 
TARGET was created by interconnecting national Euro real-time gross 
settlement (RTGS) systems and the ECB’s payment mechanism. It went live in 
January 1999. The launch of the single currency necessitated a real-time payment 
system for the Euro area: to provide the payment procedures necessary for 
implementing the ECB’s single monetary policy, and to promote sound and 
efficient payment mechanisms in Euro.  
In October 2002 the Governing Council of the ECB decided on the long-term 
strategy for 
TARGET, the new project named as: TARGET2.  TARGET2 is to become a 
system that provides extensively harmonised services via an integrated IT 
infrastructure and improves cost-efficiency. It is also prepared for swift adaptation 
to future developments, including the enlargement of the Eurosystem.  
2.10. The Future of Payment Systems 
Payment systems are developing at a faster speed as the computing technology 
and Internet capabilities are developing even faster and new user requirements are 
emerging. 
At present, payment systems are said to face the challenge of the Internet, the 
new wave of Information Technology. The Internet has the potential to impact the 
critical aspects of payment systems: their technical architecture, their underlying 
business models and systems governance, as well as the relationships with 
customers and technology suppliers (Global Electronic Finance, 2002).  
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Livarinen et al. (2003) states that “a number of signs are suggesting a kind of 
revolution concerning payment services and standards for payment systems: 
globalisation, integration, increasing speed (complete switch to real time), 
consolidation, growing payment volumes and new market participants”. Livarinen 
et al. (2003) also discuss that globalisation of payment systems requires the 
regulators and supervisors of national systems to cooperate internationally to 
control increasingly complex international entity of payment systems. 
When we look at the payment systems design and implementation process from 
the developed economies’ point of view, it is basically finding the right balance 
between regulation and innovation, regulation driven by consideration of safety and 
innovation driven by efficiency.  
Padoa-Schioppa (2003) states that two powerful drivers push the evolution of 
payment systems: innovation and internationalisation.  
We observe the positive effects of private sector innovations, for example, in the 
successful implementation and operation of the CLS system as we discussed in 
section 2.9. 
Payment system innovations have also been driven by central banks, the 
regulatory authority at the same time. We also observe that central banks have been 
in close coordination with the private sector when they plan and implement new 
systems as seen in the cases of TARGET and new design works of TARGET2 as 
we discussed in the previous section. 
Below we discuss some recent issues that may potentially affect the design of 
payment systems.  
Is the Segmentation of Payment Systems Blurring? 
With the advance of technology and processing capabilities of large volumes and 
also growing demand of customers for better retail payment services recently, 
segmentations between payment systems differentiated as high value and low value 
is fading and blurring (Padoa-Schioppa, 2003).  
Private sector practitioners indicated at the recent SIBOS Conference (2004) that 
today RTGS systems are processing more low value payments (Murphy, 2004) and 
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Is RTGSPlus the Future Direction in LVPS as Replacement of RTGS systems? 
RTGSPlus is the new German large value payment systems designed by 
Bundesbank, which started operations in 2001 and now processing the most of the 
total payments in TARGET in terms of value and volume. It belongs to the category 
of so called hybrid systems. It is designed to contain the safety features of an RTGS 
system, and to incorporate effective liquidity saving features that exist in netting 
systems. 
Single Euro Payment Area 
A major project in European Union context is worth mentioning: Single Euro 
Payment Area (SEPA). The Eurosystem supports banking industry initiatives to 
establish a single Euro payments area (SEPA). The aim is to enable European 
citizens to make payments in the Euro area as securely, quickly and efficiently as 
payments within national borders. Differences between the levels of service for 
domestic and cross-border retail payments are to be eliminated by 2010 (ECB 
Website).  
In 2002, 50 European banks and banking associations formed “European 
Payments Council (EPC)” to realise SEPA project and White Paper (EPC-White 
Paper, 2002) they express their vision for easy and inexpensive Euro payments in 
the entire Euroland. 
E-Money 
Another issue is e-money that is a value stored electronically in a device such as 
chipcard or a hard drive in a computer, which is used to make payments by 
transferring value from one storage vehicle to another. Various card-based schemes 
exist in many countries but only in a few countries have they achieved significant 
penetration (BIS/CPSS-Retail, 2003). 
Yet in the coming years private sector is expected to innovate more widespread 
used payment instruments by use of internet and mobile phone infrastructure, and 
central banks have already started to develop policy stance for this potential 
developments as discussed in detail in the BIS/CPSS report on policy issues for 
central banks in retail payments (2003).  
This chapter provided some insights into payment systems issues and their 
viability for the financial stability and improved financial services as a global 
phenomenon. At the same time, these discussions implicitly emphasised the first  
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driver of the reforms, which is the domestic demand and public policy objective for 
the economies of the world. 
3. An Evaluation of Fsap Country Reports on Payment Systems Reforms 
FSAP missions have assessed 80 systems in 60 countries by mid-2003 by 
evaluating the implementations against the core principles for Systemically 
Important Payment Systems. They have come up with major concerns in the areas 
of legal foundation, managing risks, governance and central banks lack of a 
statutory oversight role (Woltjer, 2003).  
The study on the observance of standards (so called “best-practices”) as defined 
by the core principles, indicates the observance and non-observance of each of the 
core principles and four responsibilities of central banks on 80 payment systems 
worldwide and the findings shows that yet there are major improvements to be done 
globally in order to implement safe and efficient payment systems.  
3.1. FSAP Cases From Advanced Economies 
UK: NewCHAPS system with its two sub-schemes Sterling and Euro are said to 
be robust and almost in full compliance with the core principles and Bank of 
England fulfils its oversight role successfully. A few suggestions are made for 
further improvements. And in the second review of IMF mission, the systems are 
found to be full-compliance with the core principles after the improvements works 
have been carried out promptly by related parties (FSAP-UK, 2003 March and 
July). 
Germany: Systems are found to be in full compliance with the core principles 
and Bundesbank fulfils oversight roles (FSAP-Germany, 2003). 
France: The systems in France are found to be highly advanced and almost in 
full compliance with the core principles, while one of the two private sector systems 
is recommended to increase safety and efficiency. Due to lots of external linkages, 
the operational vulnerabilities of the systems are advised to be reduced by extra 
work. A deficiency is said to be low cost recovery structure of the Banque de 
France (BdF)’s Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, where BdF heavily 
subsidises the system to compete with the private sector large value system. BdF is 
found to be fulfilling its oversight role successfully (FSAP-France, 2004). 
Japan: Systems in Japan are found to be in close compliance with the core 
principles, while some safety and efficiency suggestions are made. For one of the  
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DNS system recommendation calls for urgent response as there may be some 
systemic implications. Bank of Japan is said to be fulfilling its oversight role 
successfully (FSAP-Japan, 2003). 
3.2. FSAP Cases From Major Emerging Markets 
Singapore: Payment systems are found to be highly advanced. No 
vulnerabilities are suggested and they meet the core principles criteria. A few 
recommendations have been made to improve efficiency. The Monetary Authority 
of Singapore is structuring its oversight role to be more effective. 
Hong Kong: Payment systems environment is found to be quite advanced in 
Hong Kong and the core principles criteria largely met. Recommendations have 
been made to improve operational reliability and efficiency. The mission also noted 
that an important policy priority is a new law to give greater clarity and statutory 
foundation to payment systems oversight, including ensuring undoubted payments 
finality.  
Korea: Korean RTGS is found to be largely compliant with the core principles. 
Recommendations are made to use the use of check clearing system, another 
systemically important payment system and shift these transactions to RTGS. And 
also some advice are given to structure Bank of Korea’s oversight role effectively.   
Mexico: Large value payments are distributed among three systems, although 
one of the systems has the final settlements at the Banco de Mexico (BdM). BdM’s 
role is not very clear. Management of the risks is still the main weakness although 
various payment systems reforms were made since 1995. BdM needs to assure a 
degree of certainty for payments finality. Although the use of new technology is 
made to increase operational reliability, there is need to improve safety and 
efficiency to meet the criteria and restructure BdM’s oversight role.   
3.3. FSAP Cases from Countries in Transition 
Russia: The assessment report indicates that it is not possible to say that the 
payment systems environment in Russia is safe and secure. The report quite often 
makes references to the intention of Central Bank of Russia to implement an RTGS 
system in the near future, an intention that failed to be realised although many 
attempts have been made at the past. Apparently one basic problem is the large 
geography of Russia with many time zones and infrastructural problems. The  
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current payment system is working as a distributed gross settlement system made 
up of 78 regional systems 
The report recommends Central Bank of Russia to consider implementing the 
core principles for the planned RTGS system. The absence of a national RTGS 
system was also highlighted by another recent IMF mission as a factor inhibiting 
the development of effective monetary management techniques.  It also advises 
Central Bank of Russia to produce a strategy paper for the RTGS and to assign a 
full time project manager provided with full power to coordinate the RTGS project 
countrywide (FSAP-Russia, 2003).  
Ukraine: The report mentions that the current system that is operated by 
National Bank of Ukraine handles all inter-bank payments including cards 
transactions, working semi-manually. The report finds the system “generally secure, 
reliable and efficient”. It also mentions that National Bank of Ukraine plans an 
RTGS for future but the current system will be in place by 2010 (FSAP-Ukraine, 
2003)
10. 
Kazakhstan: The payment system environment is found to meet the criteria 
largely. Since the first assessment in 2000 National Bank of Kazakhstan acted 
promptly to make the improvements. A few recommendations are made for legal 
infrastructure. The report also mentions that payment cards are yet in their infancy, 
but growing. 
Kyrgyzistan: It is mainly a paper-based environment for payments. 
Recommendations are made to improve safety and efficiency and shift from manual 
to electronic systems. Governance and oversight function needs to be structured 
effectively.   
Georgia
11: The assessment indicates that the overall assessment of the core 
principles is satisfactory from a purely technical viewpoint. The strengths of the 
payment system can be illustrated by the full compliance with the principles dealing 
with the understanding of financial risks and procedures for managing those risks. 
However, where broader issues are concerned –for example, issues related to 
efficiency, governance or oversight- the system is less satisfactory. National Bank 
                                                 
10 We think there are some contradictions in this assessment for example; although the report explains 
the payment transmission process for settlement as being made by e-mails, which is not a secure way, 
yet the system is assessed as “having a high degree of security”.   
11 We discuss the case of Georgia in detail as it suggests that having a technologically satisfactory system 
may not necessarily provide a safe and efficient PS.  
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of Georgia (NGB)’s responsibilities for systemic oversight is not realised and NGB 
focuses mainly on its role as the technical operator of the system that it owns. The 
report also indicates that NGB appears to have adopted a passive role and has left 
the development of other systems, such as inter-bank payments and checks, credit 
cards and securities settlement systems to individual participants. In this context, 
the report further warns that the core principles remains terra incognita for NGB 
and recommends that NGB’s expertise in payment systems should be strengthened 
to assure safe and efficient development of the financial sector (FSAP-Georgia, 
2001). 
Georgia’s RTGS project has been funded by USA, as part of “USAID to Georgia 
program” from the subprogram with title “A Competitive Private Financial Sector 
that is More Responsive to the Needs of a Market-Oriented Economy (with a 
budget of $4,930,000) (USAID Georgia, Website). And with this fund the USA IT 
firm Montran implemented the RTGS project in 2001. 
3.4. FSAP Cases from EU Accession Countries 
Romania: No assessment has been made for observance of the core principles. 
Yet, it is mentioned that Romanian payment system reform process is undergoing a 
substantial changeover process, whereby an RTGS implementation is said to be 
realised by November 2004
12 (FSAP-Romania, 2003).   
Romanian RTGS is developed by Montran (Montran Website) and Italian 
software house SIA (SIA has also developed Bank of Italy’s RTGS system: BI-
REL). The contract was financed entirely by PHARE, the European Union 
programme designed to assist applicant countries of Central Europe in their 
preparations for joining the EU (SIA Website). 
Bulgaria: The assessment report states that substantial improvements are 
required for various systemically important payment systems in Bulgaria. Even in 
certain cases there are not statistics available for the operational systems.  
An RTGS is planned to be operational. Report recommends that missing safety 
and efficiency measures are taken by Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) along with 
the new RTGS implementation to meet the criteria. The report also suggests 
establishing an ongoing governance and oversight structure (FSAP-Bulgaria, 2002).  
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In July 2001 BNB has signed a contract with Montran to build the RTGS system 
(BNB Website). 
Slovenia: The payment system infrastructure in Slovenia has in recent years 
undergone important changes aimed at reducing risks and increasing efficiency. 
However, the report still finds the system in the process of transition. One very 
important reform is found to be phasing out the functions of the so-called Agency 
for Payments, an institution of the former Yugoslavian regime. In 2002, payment 
services are shifted from this agency to the financial sector. 
In 1998 Bank of Slovenia introduced a modern RTGS system and a netting 
system for small value payments. Although the report touches upon fragmentation 
of domestic payment systems, liquidity management problems, various legal and 
governance problems, the systemically important payment systems in Slovenia are 
found to be broadly robust and particularly with the adoption of the draft law on 
payment services a better score is expected for compliance (FSAP-Slovenia, 2001). 
The British company LogicaCMG provided the Slovenian payment systems 
(LogicaCMG, Website). 
Croatia: The report indicates recently significant reforms have been 
implemented in Croatian payment systems infrastructure and institutional 
framework. Croatian National Bank (CNB)’s oversight role has been strengthened 
to ensure that all payment systems satisfy the evolving needs to be placed on risk 
mitigation, efficiency and cost and the reform strategy is designed to avoid the 
creation of liquidity, credit and systemic risk. Croatia went live with an RTGS 
system in 1999. 
The report basically states that Croatian payment systems may be said to be quite 
safe and efficient and that the core principles are broadly observed. 
Recommendations are made on various legal issues including ambiguities on “zero 
hour rule”
13 and on the better organising central bank’s role to better deal with the 
payment system risks in the systems not owned by CNB (FSAP-Croatia, 2002). 
Like the case in Slovenia, transferring payment services from the inherited 
payments agency (coming from former Yugoslavia) to the financial system is still a 
reform issue (Barborosa, 2001).  
                                                 
13 “Zero Hour Rules” make all payment transactions of a bankrupt participant void from the start (“zero 
hour”) of the day of bankruptcy, causing serious systemic consequences.  
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LogicaCMG has provided the Croatian payment systems (LogicaCMG, 
Website). 
3.5. FSAP Cases from Developing Countries 
Kuwait: Payments environment in the country is mainly cash and check based. 
Although the use of credit cards and internet banking is increasing the inter-bank 
transfers are on a bilateral basis and Central Bank of Kuwait acts as a final 
settlement agent. Central Bank of Kuwait started to build an RTGS system. 
However, it is not supported by a clearly stated strategic policy objectives and 
plans. On the other hand, the lack of transparency and publicly disclosed 
participation criteria for the existing check clearing systems may be more of a 
problem when the RTGS goes live. 
Montran is implementing Kuwait’s RTGS system (Montran, Website).     
Tunisia: Mainly cash and checks are used. Banque Centrale de Tunisie plans to 
build an RTGS. 
Israel: Current environment is not found highly safe and efficient. Central 
Bank’s role is not clear and oversight function needs to be structured. There is a 
plan to build a LVPS to meet the criteria. 
Pakistan: No assessment is yet made. Basically cash and checks are used for 
payments. There is not sufficient legal infrastructure for payment systems. There is 
a plan to build an RTGS. The FSAP mission recommended establishing the 
necessary legal infrastructure, membership criteria, liquidity management approach 
and governance along with the RTGS plan.  
3.6. General Evaluation of FSAP Cases 
IMF/WB general evaluation report on assessment experience (2002) indicates 
that there are weaknesses in many of the 57 systemically important payment 
systems (in 42 countries) that were assessed between 1999 and 2001 under FSAP 
(though more recent reviews exhibit that major improvements have been made by 
most of the reassessed countries in the following rounds of assessment).  
According to this report, failure to observe the core principles arise where 
payment system participants are unable to manage credit, liquidity, and other risks 
they incur within the system arrangement, and where the system is not protected 
against one participant being unable to settle its obligations. Other problem areas  
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include: a legal framework that does not support the payment systems rules and 
regulations, an insecure operating system and environment. Many systems are not 
adequately overseen by central banks, and the governance arrangements are 
insufficiently transparent. 
FSAP general evaluation reports don’t make a distinction between developing 
and emerging economies, the ones that have moved to capital account liberalisation 
and are open markets, However, when we look at the assessments we observe that 
major emerging markets are more converging to advanced or EU accession 
countries in meeting the core principles criteria and fulfilling the responsibilities of 
central banks in reforming the oversight role. And it is understood that they make 
efforts to further improve the systems. In some cases, countries from Southeast Asia 
like Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea are at the level of sophistication as advanced 
economies (in fact, in the case studies above we grouped the cases from the major 
emerging countries under a separate heading). 
In most of the cases the monetary authorities’ responses to the FSAP assessment 
and recommendations were quite positive and they agreed to improve the safety and 
efficiency weaknesses in the payment systems and structure the oversight role 
effectively. They were also eager to go over the compliance assessment work again 
after the improvement works are performed. 
When we look at the payment systems scene after 2000, we observe that EU 
accession countries that were formerly in the list of “transition countries” and major 
emerging markets from Southeast Asia like Hong Kong, Singapore and Korea are 
converging to the level of the advanced economies. 
The other countries in transition from the former Soviet Union, exhibit different 
levels of convergence. Russia is, for instance, largely aware of the “best-practices” 
for an open economy payment systems infrastructure and spends efforts to establish 
a safe and efficient environment supported with a good governance and oversight 
despite the difficulties to manage it in a large geography with various infrastructural 
problems. Kazakhstan appears to have a highly improved payments environment, 
though modern banking products are said to be at their infancy. Kyrgyzistan does 
not have yet a safe and efficient payment system. The case of Georgia appears to be 
quite interesting. Georgia has a modern RTGS system, but reportedly the payment 
systems issues as a discipline is not well known and therefore governance and 
oversight issues remain largely unfulfilled.  
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The other developing countries, on the other hand, are yet largely far from 
meeting the criteria. Most of these counties are cash based and inter-bank payments 
are mainly dealt with check clearing systems, which are decided to be systemically 
important payment systems.  
There are also some instances like Kuwait, where technologically advanced 
systems are planned but transparency, fair access and governance issues remain to 
be improved. 
Main problems observed are: lack of safety and efficiency in the existing systems 
(mainly semi-manual check-based systems and rarely electronic and automated 
modern systems), lack of legal infrastructure to support payment systems rules and 
regulations, governance problems in general and lack of transparency, lack of 
strategy and policies for payment systems and related systems such as securities 
settlement systems and lack of central bank’s oversight role. 
In some cases of developing countries, although defects are clearly indicated in 
the reports, there is not always associated authorities’ response committing to take 
immediate actions and start planning for some safe and efficient systems. On the 
other hand, the IMF/WB report (2002) states that FSAP follow-up has included 
technical assistance from IMF and WB in some countries. 
In general, by looking at the evaluations we may conclude that there is generally 
an increasing awareness recently of payment systems issues on a global basis 
3.7. Observance of Positive Effects of International Cooperation 
First of all, FSAP reports are providing very valuable information for assessing 
both global financial stability as “a global public good” and each individual country 
on payment systems infrastructures, among other things, for financial stability. 
We had defined the second driver of recent intensive reforms on global base as 
international cooperation. We clearly observe that international cooperation, and 
particularly efforts of international financial institutions,  namely, IMF, WB, 
BIS/CPSS and central banks globally, has contributed largely to the global 
environment and each individual country regardless its level of economic 
development.  
For example, in case of Kazakhstan we see a series of FSAP reviews and in each 
review the assessors find the gaps being closed by continuous efforts. In case of 
UK, although minor recommendations had been made previously, the FSAP  
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mission reports that in a very short period of time improvements were made; and 
eventually the assessed systems are found to be in full compliance with Core 
Principles and Bank of England realising its oversight role fully. 
Another observation is that an important awareness over the “best-practices” of 
payment system issues is created in most of the developing countries after the 
assessment process. And the authorities respond to the results of assessment by 
expressing their will to start planning polices and strategies such as the cases of 
Pakistan and Tunisia. The assessment reports also imply that in some cases 
inefficiencies that became daily routines are just realised by the authorities after the 
assessment and immediate actions are taken, like in the case of Korea, where there 
was a consensus after the assessment that inefficient promissory note and check 
transactions may be turned into RTGS transfers. 
Could the improvements in payment systems globally be similar without 
BIS/CPSS reports and then assessment efforts and technical assistance of IMF/WB? 
We think, the answer is “no” as the reports exhibit clearly.  
Therefore we may conclude that international cooperation has been very 
successful and productive in this field, yet there is a long distance to go until the 
weaknesses are mitigated to meet the criteria of the core principles.    
FSAP assessments themselves have also contributed to individual countries as 
truly educational process, as well. IMF and WB mission provide all necessary 
documentation and methodology before assessments and individual countries 
prepare self-assessment reports before the actual work starts. Central banks’ 
payment systems experts also take part in the assessment process and eventually 
results are discussed with the payment systems authorities of the countries and their 
responses are also reflected in the reports.   
Publishing these reports publicly is also a very important approach in 
transparency and it also helps other countries to learn from each other’s 
experiences. 
3.8. Drawbacks Observed in FSAP Assessments 
When we look at the reports, however, we find out that FSAP assessments don’t 
always give very precise and consistent results in the individual country reports. 
The reports are not always in the same detail, for example while UK assessment is 
very detailed and comprehensive, some assessments don’t provide sufficient details  
 
 
Can Okay / Central Bank Review 2 (2004) 65-107  98
or discussions on the problematic issues. And sometimes we find some 
contradicting results as in the case of Ukraine where, reportedly, payment transfers 
directed for settlement are sent by e-mail and the assessment for CP VII (security, 
reliability and contingency arrangements) indicates that “the system has a high 
degree of security with many mutually-reinforcing and is operationally reliable”. 
And there is not any recommendation to improve the security and efficiency of this 
transmission.  
Therefore, we believe that it is necessary to improve the quality of assessment 
methodology and process. Indeed IMF/WB Report (2002) on “FSAP Experience 
with the Assessment of SIPS” addresses to this issue by mentioning that 
assessments are usually performed just by one payment system’s expert who may 
not necessarily be experienced in legal and technological issues of payment systems 
to make the necessary recommendations. It also mentions that management of the 
overall assessment process, among other things, needs to be improved. 
We think that organising the results of the assessments in main categories such 
as safety, efficiency, governance and oversight and then providing an overall 
assessment for each category, besides each individual Core Principle and central 
bank responsibility, will provide a better understanding of the assessment. 
4. Impact of Global Ict Externalities on The Reform Process 
4.1. Backgrounds on Product-Based Solutions vs. Bespoke Implementations in 
RTGS Context 
A typical modern RTGS solution will have three major parts: (1) central system, 
where all the transactions are routed, processed and settled; payment queues are 
managed and grid-locks are resolved (2) participants side, where participants’ 
systems, in most of the cases their main transaction processing environment are 
connected to the central system in real-time in a secure, reliable and integrated way 
so that they see their positions immediately and exchange their payments with other 
participants (3) RTGS network, that connects the participants and transport their 
transactions securely and efficiently. As we mentioned, SWIFT is used as the 
network of the national payment systems. An RTGS design is required to have 
highest levels of reliability and availability as very large values are circulating in 
the system with no tolerance to message loss or duplication.  
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Until quite recently, if a country decided to build an RTGS system the only 
choice was to start developing all the specifications and computer programming 
codes of the system from scratch, so called “bespoke” solution.  
Bespoke solutions require high levels of project management, coordination, 
technical and business skills. It is well known that many IT projects fail or they 
cannot be completed in time with given financial and human resources, causing 
waste of resources. And in many cases the final product may not be in compliance 
with the users’ requirements. In particular, when we speak in terms of RTGS 
systems where huge investments are involved, the project management issues of 
having timely and lean implementation becomes more critical for an economy, and 
particularly for developing countries that have less resources.  
Whereas a proven product-based (or off-the-shelf) solution is usually expected to 
contain most of the desired technical and operational features already developed 
and built in it, though there is still a need to tailor it with respect to country-specific 
environment. 
Today, we observe that many countries are able to go live much quicker than 
before with the product-based RTGS solutions. 
4.2. IT Firms Supplying Product-Based Payment Systems Solutions, 
Competition Issues and Use of SWIFT Network  
As we started to give some clues when we evaluate the FSAP country reports, 
there is a considerable amount of RTGS systems supplied by some IT firms as a 
product-based solution. 
Most of these IT firms are based in advanced economies. Their experience 
usually starts with some developments in their own home country. When they 
develop sufficient expertise in an environment with the positive externalities of 
banking and payment systems, they start to market their products to other markets 
including developing countries, though we shall later discuss whether it is really 
sufficient by itself for another country in a different part of the world merely to rely 
on a “software package” to implement a safe and efficient payment system.  
Mainly four IT firms, LogicaCMG, Montran, Perago and CMA, shares the 
market of payment systems. These vendors provide RTGS solutions, among other 
things, to individual economies by tailoring their products to each country-specific 
needs.   
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LogicaCMG (UK based IT firm) gained expertise by getting involved with UK 
payment systems, CHAPS. Later they built an RTGS system for another European 
country and taking the advantage of these experiences they made an RTGS package 
named CAS (Central Accounting System). This product is now being marketed 
globally with the highest market share of 14 central banks worldwide. 
LogicaCMS’s CAS product are used by the central banks of Azerbaijan, Chile, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg, Philippines, 
Slovenia, Sri Lanka, Trinidad-Tobago and Turkey. Logica’s CAS is also used by 
European Central Bank for TARGET system (logicaCMG, Website). 
LogicaCMG also built the Reserve Bank of India’s RTGS system, which is not 
based on CAS. 
Montran (US based IT firm) developed the RTGS systems of Antilles 
(Netherlands), Barbados, Bulgaria, Georgia, Kuwait and Romania (Montran, 
Website) 
Perago (South Africa based IT firm) developed the RTGS systems of Malawi, 
Namibia, South Africa, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe (Perago, Website). 
CMA (US based IT firm, together with Hewlett-Packard) developed the RTGS 
systems of Libya, Macedonia and Serbia (CMA, Website). 
Furthermore we may mention two more IT companies: Diamis (France based IT 
firm) developed the RTGS system of Jordan and SIA (Italy based IT firm) RTGS 
system of Italy.  
As seen in the illustrations above, the software development market in payment 
systems has quite oligopolistic structure, mainly dominated by LogicaCMG and 
few others. 
The entry barriers are already quite high due to the incumbents’ reputation, 
market share, knowledge and expertise of the payment system’s business.  
We also discussed above the ongoing consolidation process of the payment 
systems. One may expect that this process will clearly reduce the market size and 
raise the entry barriers even higher for the new comers. 
On the other hand, the advancement of the technology and developing global 
payment systems based on internet technologies and associated with all these newly 
emerging user requirements for more efficient and cheaper global payment services  
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may shake the market dominance of the existing legacy systems and create 
opportunities for the new comers' innovations, unless the incumbents make new 
investments and develop new knowledge. 
The products of the existing vendors support the use of SWIFT communications 
network and its messaging standards for payments. 
Using SWIFT network for domestic payments releases the countries from burden 
of developing secure and reliable high capacity and availability networks, that is 
very expensive. On the other hand, using the international accepted standards of 
SWIFT enables to develop connections to other domestic and cross-border payment 
systems. 
4.3. Is Just an Imported “Turnkey RTGS Solution” Enough for Safety and 
Efficiency? 
Dr. Ngalande (2003), Governor of the Reserve Bank of Malawi, at the Perago’s 
User Group Conference in Johannesburg has mentioned the contributions of Perago 
to the SADC Region by proving robust RTGS software to the individual countries 
in the region. He also mentions the benefits of the product-based RTGS system as 
providing the Reserve Bank of Malawi with up to the minute liquidity position of 
the financial market and enabling commercial banks to be able to determine their 
treasury positions and make investment decisions by way of fast flow of 
transactions. 
Could any similar level of contribution be made, say, to the prudential 
supervision function, another area of financial stability, by providing a product-
based solution if a certain economy did not have any infrastructure in place yet? 
Probably not. Any cutting-edge supervision package would definitively help to 
process the information collected from the financial institutions for a “health-
check” of each one of them by the supervisory authorities; yet ironically, it would 
not help to improve the financial positions of any individual institutions in 
consideration.  
However, as oversight function of the payment systems is focused on the system 
in general and systemic risk, the sound technological infrastructure has direct 
contribution to the system. In other words there is a causal link between the 
technological infrastructure and safe and efficient payment systems. 
Apparently, a well-designed Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) system, that 
may be bought from these vendors, would help to realise the criteria indicated by  
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CP7 (being operationally secure and reliable), which is mitigating the operational 
risks to start with and it will also help to reduce or mitigate the impacts of credit 
risk and liquidity risks, i.e. CP3 (management of financial risks), provided that the 
systems operations are supported by relevant operational measures like intra-day 
credits and payments scheduling. As an RTGS system by definition implies 
settlement finality at the accounts held by central bank and by using central bank 
assets for settlement; we may consider that CP4 (prompt final settlement), CP5 
(timely completion of daily settlements), and CP6 (safe settlement assets), are met 
largely by implementing a well-designed RTGS system, provided that necessary 
steps are taken to ensure legal certainty for finality. Additionally, such a system 
could be expected to provide a framework for implementing the remaining core 
principles of safety and efficiency, namely CP1 (sound legal basis), CP2 (clear 
understanding of financial risks), CP8 (practical and efficient way to make 
payments), CP9 (fair and objective participation criteria) and C10 (sound 
governance). 
However, as seen in most of the cases of the developing countries (very typically 
Georgia’s case) (see Chapter 3), where product-based RTGS systems are 
implemented but yet the environments reportedly suffer from the lack of sound 
legal, governance and oversight structures, we observe that product-based solutions 
may not guarantee high levels of safety and efficiency per se.  
Yet, when we compare the cases of countries where there are RTGS systems in 
place, with those where the payment systems’ environments are dominated by 
paper-based transactions like inter-bank checks and manual settlements, the former 
ones may be said to have much safer and much more efficient payment and 
settlement infrastructures from financial stability point of view.  
Iivaren (2004) states that there are more than 70 RTGS systems worldwide. Then 
we observe that global IT firms have provided nearly half of the RTGS systems as 
software packages. 
Finally, it could be said that the observations are in fact in alignment with our 
emphasise on the importance of the third driver, the positive effect of global IT 
firms and SWIFT network in implementing payment systems reforms, which is in 
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5. Conclusion  
In this paper, we discussed the recent intensive payment systems reforms 
observed on global basis and looked into the three main drivers of this process, 
namely strong domestic demand to provide financial stability and better financial 
services, increasing levels of international cooperation driven by IFIs and positive 
externalities of globalisation driven by ICT companies. 
In this context, we explained the vitality of payment systems and their public 
policy objectives as safety and efficiency for an economy from various perspectives, 
that no doubt justifies the allocation of large resources for reforming payment 
systems with respect to the recently defined “best-practices” as an ongoing process 
at the present. 
As clearly seen in the FSAP reports, prepared for each country assessed and 
general evaluation of the assessments, the three drivers we analysed have helped to 
implement safe and efficient payment systems on a global basis. Yet, there are still 
weaknesses to be addressed in the future by individual countries such as 
implementing a consistent payment system strategy, improving legal framework, 
governance (including issues like transparency and fair-access) and also structuring 
the central bank’s oversight function. 
On the other hand, we understand that unexceptionally all of the countries 
assessed have positively responded in appreciating the weaknesses and performing 
the works to fill in the gaps. We also understand from the successive assessments 
made to the same country that most of them have quickly strengthened their 
systems in accordance with the recommendations. 
One important observation in the advanced economies is that the authorities have 
focused on more deregulation and leaving sufficient room for private sector 
innovations in retail payment services, yet the large value payment systems are 
actually developed by the central banks’ innovations in cooperation with private 
sector as is the case with TARGET and RTGSPlus.  
Developing countries suffer from the same structural problems such as lack of 
skills, qualified human resources in payment systems and governance issues, as it is 
often the case in any other area of financial stability and development. At the same 
time, we witness somewhat faster developments in the reform process of payment 
systems than in other areas of financial stability due to the international cooperation 
providing financial and technical support that are highly complemented by the  
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externalities created by global ICT firms providing proven product based payment 
systems solutions and communication networks. 
In final words, the institutionalised strategy of improving financial stability 
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